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Labor Demand During the Crisis: What Happened in Germany?
* 
 
In Germany, the employment response to the post-2007 crisis has been muted compared to 
other industrialized countries. Despite a large drop in output, employment has hardly 
changed. In this paper, we analyze the determinants of German firms’ labor demand during 
the crisis using a firm-level panel dataset. Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we 
estimate a dynamic labor demand function for the years 2000-2009 accounting for the degree 
of working time flexibility and the presence of works councils. Second, on the basis of these 
estimates, we use the difference between predicted and actual employment as a measure of 
labor hoarding as the dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression for 2009. Apart from 
total labor hoarding, we also look at the determinants of subsidized labor hoarding through 
short-time work. The structural characteristics of firms using these channels of adjustment 
differ. Product market competition has a negative impact on total labor hoarding but a 
positive effect on the use of short-time work. Firm covered by collective agreements hoard 
less labor overall; firms without financial frictions use short-time work less intensively. 
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1  Motivation 
Labor market developments following the post-2007 crisis have diverged across 
countries. In the U.S., unemployment rates more than doubled from 4.4% in December 
2006 to 10.0% at the end of 2009.
1 In Germany, by contrast, unemployment was lower 
at the end of 2009 (8.7%) than at the end of 2006 (10.7%). These differences are in 
striking contrast to the different output responses. In 2009, output contracted much more 
in Germany (-5.0%) than in the U.S. (-2.4%) (IMF  2010). Also, the employment 
response has been muted compared to previous recessions in Germany (Burda and Hunt 
2011).  
What happened in Germany during the recent crisis? To answer this question, we use 
establishment-level panel data from the German IAB Establishment Panel, and we 
analyze firms’ labor demand before and during the crisis. We use new data released in 
2010 covering employment in a representative sample of establishments up to mid-2009 
and thus including the peak of the crisis. The data contain information on various labor 
market institutions at the firm level, on financial frictions, and on competition intensity. 
These factors help explaining why only 38% of the firms in our sample reduced 
employment whereas, according to our panel estimates of the labor demand function, 
61% of the firms were predicted to do so. The remaining firms hoarded labor, and we 
analyze which economic and institutional factors facilitated labor hoarding. 
There are at least four possible explanations for Germany’s robust labor market 
performance.  
First, the government has intervened in the labor market by subsidizing labor hoarding 
through short-time work benefits (Kurzarbeit). These benefits provide a financial 
incentive to adjust to lower demand by reducing hours worked rather than cutting 
employment, and they allow firms to shift some of the costs of labor hoarding to the 
government. Labor hoarding is advantageous for firms if demand picks up following a 
recession: workers can quickly move back into employment, and firms do not loose 
qualified and experienced personnel. Short-time work has consequently been identified 
as one main reason for the relatively good employment performance of the German 
economy during and after the crisis (IMF 2010). At the same time, German firms also 
                                                 
1   U.S. numbers are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/Survey 
OutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000). German numbers are from the 
Federal Statistical Office (http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/ 
Content/Statistics/TimeSeries/EconomicIndicators/LabourMarket/Content75/arb210a.psml). 2 
 
engaged in unsubsidized labor hoarding by not adjusting labor input in line with the 
drop in demand.  
The use of labor hoarding also depends on the financial situation of the firms prior to 
the recession. During the previous boom from 2005 to 2007, many companies have 
accumulated profits. Firms with sufficiently “deep pockets” could sustain employment 
at its previous levels even without help from the government budget. Consistent with 
this, we find that a high degree of competition in the product market is associated with 
subsidized labor hoarding through short-time work and less unsubsidized labor 
hoarding. Thus, short-time work accounts for stable employment in some parts of  
the economy, with unsubsidized hoarding prevails in other parts.   
Second, several labor market institutions may have had a favorable impact during the 
crisis. The German collective bargaining system has become more flexible over the past 
decade in several ways: working time flexibility has increased because of the 
introduction of working time accounts; firms may use opening clauses in collective 
bargaining agreements to cushion negative demand shocks, thus preventing mass 
redundancies and firm closures; the overall coverage of the collective bargaining system 
has fallen substantially. Hence, local bargaining over wages, working time, and work 
conditions has become more prevalent. At the same time, employment protection 
regulation and works councils make redundancies costly for firms. Indeed, our results 
show that firms with works councils have higher employment levels in normal times 
and have hoarded more labor during the crisis. In addition, working time accounts 
helped firms to manage fluctuations in demand: employment in firms using working 
time accounts extensively is more persistent, and it reacts less to changes in output and 
wages. This higher degree of flexibility reduced firms’ need to adjust staff numbers also 
during the crisis.  
Third, financial frictions may have been less binding during the crisis in Germany than 
in other countries due to the three-tier structure of its banking sector. Although German 
banks have been a main source of financing for the U.S. subprime sector prior to the 
crisis (Sinn 2009) and have thus been hit hard by the crisis on international banking 
markets, many of the banks that suffered losses do not play a major role in the domestic 
retail market. Smaller savings and cooperative banks, which dominate the retail segment 
of the German banking market, have remained relatively unaffected by the crisis. 
Consistent with this, larger and presumably more export-oriented firms have reported a 
tightening of credit constraints during the crisis more so than small and mid-sized firms 
(Rottmann and Wollmershäuser 2010). Our results also show that firms facing no 
financial frictions relied less on subsidized labor hoarding than others. 3 
 
Fourth, the type of shock affecting the U.S. and Germany may have also affected 
employment responses (IMF 2010). While the U.S. experienced the bursting of a 
housing bubble leading to a systemic financial crisis, Germany was mainly affected 
through the decline in external demand. This might have influenced expectations about 
the duration of the crisis. If firms expected the crisis to be of a relatively short-term 
nature, it would be a rational response to hoard labor rather than to layoff – and later 
recall – workers. Therefore, we control for the firms’ export share in some of our 
specifications, but we find no significant effects. 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. We combine panel- and cross-sectional estimation 
methods because the most recent available wave of our panel data, conducted in June  
of 2009, includes questions directly related to the effects of the crisis. Yet, we also want 
to exploit the full panel dimension of our dataset. In a first step, we thus estimate a 
dynamic labor demand function for the time period 2000 through 2008 using General 
Methods of Moments (GMM) estimators. In a second step, we use the residuals from 
this regression for the first half of 2009, which can be interpreted as a measure of labor 
hoarding, as a dependent variable in a cross-sectional regression. We take into account a 
number of factors which may have influenced firm-level adjustment during the crisis – 
short-time work, labor market institutions, and financial frictions. Hence, we ask the 
question whether these institutional arrangements have had an impact on the labor 
demand of firms conditional upon the longer-run determinants of labor demand. In 
addition, we use the share of short-time work as a proxy for subsidized labor hoarding 
as the dependent variable. 
We confine our analysis to the federal state of Baden-Württemberg because we have 
access to data on actual output in the crisis year 2009. According to national accounts 
data for 2009, the share of Baden-Württemberg’s output in national GDP was 14.3%, 
the employment share 13.8% and the share of exports 15.5%. With an output decline  
of 7.4% in 2009, Baden-Württemberg has been hardest hit by the crisis among all 16 
German federal states. Correspondingly, the use of subsidized short-time work was 
particularly high. In April 2009, 328.000 employees were in short time-work in Baden-
Württemberg, corresponding to 21.4% of all German workers in short-time work.
2 
We are not the first to analyze the adjustment of German firms to economic crises, but 
we are the first to do so in a regression framework based on firm-level data and for the 
current crisis. Previous empirical evidence suggests hat labor market reforms and the 
behavior of social partners have enhanced the ability of firms to accommodate a 
                                                 
2   These numbers were taken from the statistics of the Federal Employment Agency,  
http://www.pub.arbeitsamt.de/hst/services/statistik/detail/s.html 4 
 
(temporary) decline in demand. Time series evidence shows that, possibly supported by 
the generous short-time work schemes, firms’ were willing to pursue a strategy of 
massive labor hoarding in 2009 (Möller 2010). Based on a cross-country analysis, 
Möller (2010) also argues that employment protection has not played a major role in 
explaining the adjustment behavior of German firms. Using the same firm-level data set 
as in our paper, Dietz et al. (2010)  report changes in working hours during the crisis 
due to short-time work, reducing overtime, and working time accounts. Based on 
evidence from the last recession in 2003, these authors argue that, although short-time 
work has facilitated labor hoarding, the program was also used by firms not 
experiencing measurable losses in revenue. Boeri and Bruecker (2011) also use the  
IAB Establishment Panel and study the determinants of short-time work and working 
time accounts. They find relatively moderate deadweight losses of the short-time work 
program.  
Burda and Hunt (2011) use time series regressions on aggregate as well as industry-
level data. They argue that two factors are behind the “labor market miracle” in 
Germany during the recent crisis. First, firms expanded employment less in the boom 
period preceding the crisis than in earlier boom periods. Hence, there was less need  
for an adjustment of employment in the crisis. Second, adjustment during the crisis is 
attributed to changes in labor market regulations prior to the crisis. In particular, Burda 
and Hunt argue that firms have used working time accounts as substitutes for the use  
of short-time work. Our results allow analyzing the interplay between different labor 
market institutions at the firm-level. They show that, in firms with work time accounts, 
employment is indeed more persistent (a result of our first-stage estimates). However, 
there is no additional effect of work time accounts on the adjustment of employment 
during the crisis (a result of our second-stage estimates). 
In section 2, we provide an overview of German labor market regulations before and 
during the crisis. Section 3 introduces the data and provides descriptive statistics. 
Section 4 contains the estimation approach and the empirical results for the dynamic 
labor demand specification. Section 5 presents results for the second-step cross-
sectional estimation. Section 6 concludes.  
2  Labor Market Adjustment in Germany Before and During the 
Crisis 
Labor market institutions have an important impact on how firms can adjust to crises. 
There is ample evidence showing that the labor market performance of countries can be 
traced to differences in shocks, differences in institutions, and the interaction between 5 
 
those two (see, e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers 2000). In this paper, we are interested in 
explaining labor market outcomes at the establishment level for German firms during 
the crisis that started in 2007. These outcomes are likely to be influenced by specific, 
short-run policy measures, such as the subsidization of short-time work programs, as 
well as longer run trends on the German labor markets, which have affected the ability 
of firms to adjust to external shocks, such as the increased use of work time accounts. 
2.1  Short-Time Work 
Short-time work programs help firms to shield employment against cyclical fluctuation 
of demand, and they exist in the majority of OECD countries. Short-time compensation 
can take the form of wage supplements paid directly by the employer and reimbursed by 
the employment agency, as it is the case in Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy,  
or Portugal. But it can also consist of direct payments by the unemployment insurance 
agency as in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain, or the UK. The European Commission 
(2010) classifies the arrangements in Spain or Portugal as being more generous than 
unemployment benefits, the arrangements in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, 
Spain, Ireland or Luxemburg as being as generous as unemployment benefits and the 
arrangements in Finland or France as less generous than unemployment benefits. 
In Germany, short-time work has existed as an instrument of labor market policy since 
1957. Under this scheme, financed by the Federal Agency for Labor (Bundesagentur  
für Arbeit), working time may be reduced by up to 100%. To compensate for the 
income lost, employees receive a transfer of 60% of their former net income (67% for 
employees with at least one child). Although the transfers are publicly financed, short-
time work programs are costly for the firms because firms have to pay social security 
contributions. Moreover, many collective agreements provide for additional firm-
financed payments on top of the 60% (67%) provided by the federal program.  
While, in principle, short-time work programs have been a feature of the German labor 
market for a long time, the use of these programs has particularly been encouraged and 
more highly subsidized by the government during the post-Lehman crisis. The require-
ment to pay social security contributions has been relaxed: for the first six months under 
the program, employees had to pay only 50% of the social security contributions; after 6 
months, payments were waived, thus increasing the costs of the programs for the 
Federal Employment Agency. Still, Bach and Spitznagel (2009) calculate that the 
remaining costs for firms not covered (covered) by collective agreements amount to  
24-35% (37-48%) of regular labor costs. 6 
 
Generally, the use of short-time work is restricted to a maximum of 6 months. The 
Federal Ministry of Labor can extend this deadline to a maximum of 24 months in 
situations of extreme tensions on the labor market. This right has been used in May 
2009, as the maximum period has been extended 24 months. Subsequently, the 
maximum duration has been shortened to 18 months.  
Short-time work programs have been used extensively by German firms during the 
crisis. At the peak time of the program in May 2009, about 1.5 million employees (5.6% 
of all regular employees) participated. Total reduction in working hours amounted to 
340,000 jobs in 2009, measured as full-time equivalents (Dietz et al. 2010). Afterwards, 
participation started to decline (Figure 1). In Baden-Württemberg, 328.000 employees 
or 21.4% of the total have been covered by short-time work, which is substantially 
above the share of the state in total employment (13.8%). 
Figure 1 here 
2.2  Working Time Accounts 
While the use of short-time work can be characterized as a subsidized form of labor 
hoarding, firms can also use unsubsidized forms of adjustment to lower output demand 
and draw down working time accounts. Generally, working time accounts aim at 
improving flexibility at the firm level by allowing firms to adjust employment in 
response to fluctuations in demand. Instead of working fixed daily or weekly hours, 
employees accumulate working time depending on whether actual hours worked exceed 
or fall short of contractual working hours. Firm-specific regulations determine the 
degree of flexibility and stipulate the time intervals within which the account has to  
be balanced.  
In Germany, the share of employees using working time accounts has increased steadily 
from 38% in 1999 to 47% in 2007 (Groß 2009). Compared to other European countries, 
working-time accounts are more widespread in Germany. In 2004, 42.5 % (38.2%) of 
German male (female) employees used working-time accounts compared to an average 
of 11.5% (11.6%) in the EU-25 countries (Hardarson 2007).  
Overall, we would expect a slower overall adjustment in employment numbers over the 
business cycle and a positive impact of work time accounts on employment during a 
crisis if firms have gone through sufficiently long boom periods before.  7 
 
2.3  Works Councils 
Another firm-level labor market institution, which can have an impact on the flexibility 
of firms to adjust to the crisis, is works councils. Works councils are the main institution 
of shop-floor worker representation in Germany. In establishments with at least five 
employees, workers are legally entitled to establish a works council. In practice, 
however, employees in small establishments often do not take the initiative to set up 
such a council. Participation rights of works councils are regulated in detail by the 
Works Constitution Act and the Dismissal Protection Law. Articles 102-104 of the 
Works Constitution Act grant consultation rights in dismissal cases. Works councils can 
raise objections within one week of the notification of dismissal. In addition, the works 
council can make suggestions on how to stabilize employment; the employer has the 
obligation to respond to these suggestions. According to Article 112 of the Works 
Constitution Act, the works council has a right to participate in drawing up a social plan 
in the case of mass redundancies. The presence of a works council can, therefore, be 
expected to increase dismissal costs. This applies to cases of individual layoffs
3 as well 
as to mass redundancies.
4 Thus, during a crisis, one would expect fewer workers being 
made redundant in firms with a works council compared to other firms.  
2.4  Collective Agreements 
Collective agreements are a long-standing feature of the German labor market. They are 
negotiated at the industry level between unions and employers’ associations, and they 
are mandatory for all employees if the employer is a member of an employers’ 
association.  From a theoretical point of view, collective bargaining could increase or 
decrease firms’ flexibility in response to external demand shocks. On the one hand, 
collective bargaining enhances the bargaining power of unions, thus ceteris paribus 
increasing wages and reducing flexibility. On the other hand, centralized collective 
bargaining may encourage unions to negotiate wages and employment conditions in a 
way that takes negative feedback effects for the sector as a whole or for the unemployed 
into account (Calmfors and Driffill 1988). 
At least over the past two decades, industry-level collective bargaining has become less 
prevalent, which reflects two different trends. First, coverage by collective bargaining is 
lower in East than in West Germany. In 2003, 70% of West German employees but only 
47% of East German employees were covered by collective agreements. In addition, 
coverage declined from 76 to 65% of all employees in West Germany and from 63 to 
                                                 
3    See Article 99ff. of the German Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). 
4    Article 17 of the German Protection Against Dismissals Act (Kündigungsschutzgesetz). 8 
 
51% in East Germany between 1998 and 2009 (WSI 2010).
5 Second, there has been a 
trend towards local bargaining with an increasing use of opening clauses, allowing for 
deviations from the terms of the collective agreements (Heinbach 2007, Heinbach and 
Schröpfer 2007). Flexible working time regulations, including working time accounts, 
have been introduced frequently by means of opening clauses.   
2.5  Financial Frictions  
Firm size and the degree of export orientation have generally affected the exposure of 
firms to the world financial crisis. But since the crisis has been triggered by a large 
adverse financial market shock, it is likely to have affected firms with a high degree  
of external finance dependence more than others. The employment consequences of 
financial frictions have been investigated previously in the empirical literature. Funke  
et al. (1999) link capital structure to employment decisions. They show that higher  
debt asset ratios have a negative impact on employment. In a dynamic labor demand 
framework, von Kalckreuth (2008) does not find robust difference in the speed of 
adjustment to shocks between financially constrained and unconstrained firms.  
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To analyze the labor demand of German firms during the crisis, we use a representative 
establishment-level panel data-set for German firms (IAB-Betriebspanel) (see Fischer et 
al. 2008.) The Data Appendix provides information on the variables included in the 
surveys. The IAB Establishment Panel has a special focus on labor market conditions. 
The survey has been conducted annually since 1993, and panel data are available for 
about 16,000 plants representative of all industries, regions, and size classes, of which 
more than 1,000 are located in Baden-Württemberg. 
For our panel analysis, we use 9 cross-sections (2000 to 2008).
6 Not all of the questions 
of interest to us have been asked in all waves. A first set of variables including employ-
ment, sales, wages, the presence of a works council, or coverage by collective 
bargaining is available in each cross section. Information on a second set of variables  
is collected every two or three years. Among these variables are the use of short-time 
work and working time accounts.  
                                                 
5   See the statistics from WSI, the German trade unions’ Economic and Social Institute, at 
http://www.boeckler.de/549_19392.html 
6   Prior to 2000, the sample for Baden-Württemberg is too small to be representative for the 
establishments in this federal state. 9 
 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of establishments with specific labor market arrange-
ments and financial frictions by establishment size, for the year 2009. Larger firms are 
more likely than smaller firms to use short-time work and working time accounts, which 
should increase flexibility and reduce the need to use short-time work programs. 
Flexibility of large firms may be reduced by the presence of works councils though: 
very few small establishments but almost all large firms have works councils.  
Figure 2 here 
Incentives to use short-time work are also correlated with the exposure of firms to 
fluctuations in external demand and the perceived intensity of competition. The bulk of 
employees in short-time work (85%) are in the manufacturing sector and thus in the 
tradables sector; producers of nontradables such as firms in construction, trade, or other 
services are much less affected (Behringer et al. 2010). The share of workers in short-
time work is lower in industries that the firms themselves classify as being competitive. 
This finding can be explained by the fact that companies using short-time work are still 
facing substantial costs of labor hoarding (Bach and Spitznagel 2009). These costs are 
more easily borne if profit margins are sufficiently high. 
Table 1 provides correlation coefficients between the log employment change between 
2008 and 2009 and the institutional variables. There is a highly significant negative 
correlation between the proportion of workers in short-time work and employment 
changes, implying reductions in employment in establishments that use short-time work 
(see also Dietz et al. 2010). A negative correlation between firm-level outcomes and the 
use of short-time work is also reported for other countries. For the French case, 
Calavrezo et al. (2008) show that participation in the STC program does not prevent 
redundancies. Calavrezo et al. (2010) report higher exit rates for firms having used 
short-time work provisions. 
At first sight, the negative correlation between changes in employment and the use of 
short-time work finding is at odds with the conventional wisdom that short-time work 
has helped to stabilize employment. The reason could be that firms used cuts in the 
work force and short-time work as complementary instruments to deal with declining 
demand. The same may be true for working time accounts, which are also negatively 
correlated with changes in employment. We also see a negative correlation between 
employment growth and coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. This could 
point to the fact that collective agreements prevent wages from adjusting downwards, 
which in turn increases redundancies during a crisis. There are no significant 
correlations for works councils or financial frictions.  10 
 
Table 1 here 
Concerning financial frictions, firms are asked every two to three years whether they 
have experienced difficulties in raising external capital for investment or innovation. 
We identify the following groups of firms in our sample: (i) firms that experienced 
difficulties in obtaining external financing for implementing investment plans or 
innovations, (ii) firms that had no difficulties in obtaining external finance for invest-
ment or innovations or relied on equity capital for these purposes, and (iii) firms without 
investments or innovations and therefore without financing needs for these purposes.  
Figure 2 shows the percentages of firms in groups (i) and (ii). For 2009, the question  
on financial frictions captures the effects of the economic crisis. Generally, the number 
of firms reporting financial frictions is small: only 2% of establishments reported 
difficulties with raising external finance during the recent crisis (Figure 2) and in 
previous years (Figure 3). Other surveys, such as those conducted by the German ifo 
Institute show much higher values.
7  
Figure 3 here 
The share of firms reporting financial frictions during the crisis has been small, 
consistent with the lack of evidence for a credit crunch in Germany during this period. 
Still, it may seem surprising that only a few firms report being credit constrained, and 
that this share has been even smaller in 2004 when economic conditions were more 
favorable. There are two possible explanations for this. First, data for 2004 cover 
innovation financing, whereas, in other years, the question refers to investment. Since it 
is more difficult to pledge collateral for investments into R&D and innovation than for 
capital investments, one would expect to find a higher share of credit-constrained firms. 
Second, the IAB Establishment Panel asks about difficulties with regard to financing 
investment or innovation; in the ifo survey, the question is more general. In particular 
during the recent crisis, access to working capital is like to have been a more important 
constraint than access to investment finance. Finance for investment is unlikely to have 
a major concern in this period, given the underutilization of capacities. 
                                                 
7   More specifically, in the ifo survey, firms are asked “How would you assess the current willingness 
of banks to extend credit to businesses”?, and 39% of the firms consider banks’ credit supply 
policies as being restrictive (Rottmann and Wollmershäuser 2010). 11 
 
4  Estimation of a Dynamic Labor Demand Function from Panel Data 
How have German firms adjusted their demand for labor during and after the crisis? 
Have firms that export been affected more? Has access to finance affected the adjust-
ment? And to what extent have recent changes in labor market institutions and 
regulations smoothened the adjustment?  
In answering these questions using data from the IAB Establishment Panel, we have  
to accommodate the fact that some questions have been asked only during the crisis 
period. For instance, short-time work had no practical importance over most of the 
2000s (Figure 1). Also, the employment response to existing institutions such as 
collective agreements and working time accounts may have been quite different during 
the crisis as compared to previous years.  
We thus follow a two-step empirical approach. In a first step, we estimate a dynamic 
labor demand function using the full set of panel observations (2000-2008). In a second 
step, reported in Section 5, we use the residuals from this regression as a dependent 
variable in a cross-section regression for the first half of 2009, conditioning on the 
different channels of adjustment to the crisis. These residuals can be interpreted as a 
“shock” to labor demand due to the crisis. This two-step methodology also allows for 
the fact that adjustment in the immediate aftermath of the crisis might be different than 
the longer-run labor demand of firms. 
4.1  Derivation of Labor Demand 
Using a CES production function, log labor demand is a linear function of wages, 
interest rates and output (Hamermesh 1996):  
it it it LK it LL
d
it y r w c l          1        ( 1 )  
where  LL   and  LK   denote the constant-output labor demand elasticities with regard to 
wages and interest rates,  it w  denotes firm-level wages,  it r  denotes firm-level interest 
rates, and  it y  is firm-specific output. Including firm-specific output allows estimating 
the elasticity of labor demand for a given scale of activities.  
The empirical model derived from (1) is specified as 
it it it it it it Z w y l l              ' ln ln ln 3 2 1 1 0      ( 2 )  
where  1  it l  is lagged employment, and  it Z  is a vector of control variables.  Firm-level 
output  it y  is measured with a lag of one year. Time and industry fixed effects are 12 
 
included to capture price changes and other developments at the industry level such as 
the cost of capital, for which we do not have reliable firm-level estimates. 
As regards the control variables  it Z , we start by including information about financial 
frictions, labor market institutions, firms’ exports, as well as other firm-level 
information.  
Our data include information about staff numbers, but little information on working 
time – it merely contains standard hours and the proportion of part-time workers. 
Cleary, adjustment of hours of employment (the intensive margin) and employment 
numbers (the extensive margin) may evolve differently.
8 Moreover, these two channels 
of adjustment may be used as substitutes: companies with higher working time 
flexibility may exhibit smaller employment changes. To address this aspect in our 
estimations, we estimate equation (2) for two sub-sets of our data: companies using 
working time accounts for more than 50% of their employees (measured over the  
whole length of the data)
9 and companies using them less frequently, including those 
companies not using them at all.  
4.2  Specification of the Dynamic GMM Model 
Equation (2) includes a lagged term to account for the persistence of employment. In 
our empirical specifications reported below, the first lag of the endogenous variable is 
indeed highly significant. Since the residuals are correlated with the endogenous 
variables, fixed effects estimates would be biased. We use the one-step system GMM 
estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) which allows unbiased coefficients 
 to be estimated in dynamic panels. 
Our main regression results are based on a system GMM model. Generally, system 
GMM should be preferred over difference GMM if the dependent variable (here: 
employment) is stationary. Intuitively, stationarity implies that firms are in their 
respective steady state and that fast-growing firms are not systematically closer to or 
further away from their steady state than slow-growing firms. During the convergence 
process, employment in smaller (larger) firms would tend to increase (decrease).  
Using lagged employment changes as instruments in a system GMM model would  
be inappropriate since the instruments would be correlated with the fixed effects. If 
                                                 
8   Previous evidence for Germany shows that, in contrast to the US, changes in employment mainly 
occur along the intensive margin (see Burda and Hunt 2011 for details). 
9   The information is regarded as time-constant because information on the use of working time 
accounts is not requested in all waves. The time variation in this variable is limited. We also 
checked the robustness of our results by using different ways of splitting the sample. The results 
were very similar.  13 
 
employment is stationary, difference GMM performs poorly because it uses past levels 
as instruments, which carry little information about future employment changes.  
Due to the unbalanced nature of our panel and the short time series dimension, we 
cannot apply standard panel unit root tests to check whether employment is stationary. 
We thus follow Roodman (2009) and use an indirect method of assessing the 
appropriateness of choosing system over difference GMM. We estimate equation (3) 
using a naïve OLS and a within-panel model (unreported). This gives a range for the 
lagged coefficient term between 0.48 and 0.96. All our estimates reported below give 
point estimates within this range.  
We treat firm-level variables such as sales and wages as endogenous, and we use the 
second and earlier lags as instruments. We use the first lag and earlier of the instrument 
variable for the transformed equation. Sector and time dummies are treated as 
exogenous, and these variables are included in the set of IV rather than GMM-type 
instruments.  
An additional concern is instrument proliferation (Roodman 2008). The instrument 
count in system GMM is quadratic in T. Because the maximum string of firm-level 
observations is eight years and because the time dimension is much shorter for some 
model specifications, we use the one-step instead of the – more data-intensive – two-
step estimator. Additionally, we use the Difference-in-Hansen test for the full set of 
instruments as well as for different subsets of regressors. 
For each regression, we report the degrees of freedom of the Sargan and Hansen tests, 
i.e. the number of instruments minus the number of regressors. As a rule of thumb, the 
number of instruments used should be strictly smaller than the number of groups. This 
is the case.  
Our estimation results are consistent if we use appropriate instruments for our lagged 
endogenous variable and if there is no second-order autocorrelation. Tests on first and 
second-order serial correlation and the Hansen test on overidentifying restrictions do not 
allow the validity of our specification and instruments to be rejected. The same holds 
for (unreported) Difference-in-Hansen tests. Generally, the Hansen test is insignificant 
while the Sargan test is not. We follow the Hansen test because the Sargan test imposes 
stricter assumptions such as, for instance, the assumption that the residuals are i.i.d., 
which might not hold. However, these assumptions are not required for consistency. 
Therefore, we use the Hansen statistic from the two-step estimates as a theoretically 
superior identification test for the one-step estimator (Roodman 2009). We also run 
several (unreported) robustness tests with regard to the specification of the dynamic 14 
 
models and the set of instruments included. Our qualitative results are robust with 
regard to these modifications. 
4.3  Estimation Results for Dynamic Labor Demand  
Table 2 provides the results from the first-stage regressions. We first estimate equation 
(2) without including industry dummies and without any of the institutional variables. 
Second, we check which of the institutional variables (works councils, collective 
agreements, financial frictions, export orientation) influence the employment levels. 
Only the presence of a works council has a robust influence on employment while the 
remaining results are largely unchanged.
10 Therefore, a works council dummy is 
included in a specification which, in addition, also has industry dummies. Finally, we 
split the sample according to whether the majority of employees is covered by working 
time accounts to accommodate the fact that firms can adjust both, the number of 
employees and the volume of hours worked per employee.  
Coefficients of standard labor demand variables are in line with expectations: labor 
demand increases in output, and the point estimate for the short-run effect is about 0.15. 
This is comparable to the estimates reported in Hamermesh (1996) and in Buch and 
Lipponer (2010) for German firms. Also, the negative coefficient on wages is in line 
with expectations. The point estimate of the short-run effect is -0.08, which is somewhat 
smaller in absolute terms than previous estimates for Germany. The presence of a works 
council increases employment, in line with the “overstaffing” hypothesis.  
Table 2 here 
By providing an alternative means of adjustment, working time accounts should mainly 
influence the speed of adjustment of employment rather than the level of employment. 
Firms with working time accounts have more flexibility in adjusting working time 
following demand shocks. This reduces the need to adjust employment by laying off 
workers (or to temporarily hire new workers). One would thus expect smaller wage and 
output elasticities and more persistence in the level of employment in establishments 
using working time accounts.  Our results lend support to these hypotheses. Sales and 
wage elasticities are higher for firms with no or little use of working time accounts, and 
the degree of persistence (as measured by the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable) is lower. The wage elasticity is insignificant in both sub-samples. Using an 
unreported fully interacted model, we tested for the significance of the differences in  
                                                 
10   In further (unreported) estimates, we split the sample by size, sector, and export activity. The 
estimation results do not indicate that these variables have a robust influence on labor demand.  15 
 
the coefficients. The results show that the restrictions imposed by pooling over firms 
using and not using working time accounts are rejected.
11 
In sum, results from the first stage regressions are largely in line with previous estimates 
of labor demand functions: labor demand is highly persistent, it increases in firm-level 
output, and it falls in firm-level wages. The presence of a works council has a positive 
impact on employment. The elasticity of employment with respect to wages depends on 
whether or not firms use working time accounts: employment in firms which use 
working time accounts for most of their employees adjusts less than employment in 
other firms.  
5  What Explains Labor Hoarding during the Crisis?  
In the following, we use the cross-sectional variation in labor demand in 2009 to 
explore the extent of labor hoarding in German firms during the crisis. We analyze  
the question which instruments helped German firms to maintain a high level of 
employment despite the crisis. Moreover, we are interested in the question whether  
total labor hoarding and short time work as a form of subsidized labor hoarding were 
used by similar firms. This could indicate whether these measures are substitutes of 
complements and whether deadweight effects of public subsidies are an issue.  
5.1  Cross-Sectional Estimation of Adjustment Channels 
We use two different endogenous variables related to labor hoarding and adjustment: 
the change in residual employment (total labor hoarding) and the share of workers in 
short-time work (subsidized labor hoarding). The change in residual employment is 
conditional on the short-run determinants of labor demand explored in the first stage of 
the model.
12 
                                                 
11   The Wald test statistic for the test for all coefficient differences is 33.1 (p-level: 0.016). If the test is 
limited to the coefficients for lagged employment, sales and wages, the test statistic is 9.1 (p-level: 
0.028). 
12   We also attempted to combine residual employment changes and short-time work into a joint model, 
in order to estimate to which degree the use of short-time work has contributed to total labor 
hoarding. A major concern is, however, that short-time work is endogenous with respect to 
employment changes. As Table 1 shows, there is a strong relationship between short-time work and 
reductions in employment. This relationship may be due to unobserved factors at the firm level and 
inflict a negative bias on the estimated impact of short-time work on employment. Indeed, our OLS 
results showed a negative (albeit insignificant) coefficient of short-time work. We went on to an IV 
strategy, using the past use of subsidized labor (such as hiring subsidies) as an instrument for short-
time work. The idea was that past use of subsidies from the federal employment agency reduces the 
costs of applying for new ones. The results confirmed this notion, but the instrument is relatively 
weak.  16 
 
For the first dependent variable, we use specification (2) in a regression up to the year 
2008 in order to obtain coefficients not influenced by the crisis.
13 Using the coefficients 
from this regression, we predict employment for 2009 and calculate predicted residuals 
for the change in log employment. We use this as a measure of total labor hoarding.
14 
The model predicts a decline in employment for 315 out of 442 establishments. In 
reality, however, only 169 establishments actually lowered their staff numbers, 
corresponding to 53.7% of all establishments predicted to reduce employment. This 
shows that there is a structural break in employment in 2009 and that labor hoarding  
is a frequent case in our sample.  
The second measure of labor hoarding is the proportion of workers in short-time work. 
We use the number of workers affected by short-time work, because we have no 
information on reductions in working hours. We use this as a measure of subsidized 
labor hoarding.  
In separate cross-sectional estimations, we regress the two measures of labor hoarding 
on variables measuring the severity of the crisis and different institutions affecting the 
required adjustment:  
 
2009 , 2009 ,
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        (3) 
where the dependent variable is either residual employment changes ( E ˆ log  )  or the 
proportion of workers in short-time work (STW):  
} , ˆ log { 2009 , 2009 , 2009 , i i i STW E Y   . 
The independent variables include a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is 
covered by a collective agreement (CC), a dummy variable indicating the presence  
of a works council (WC), and measures for financial frictions (FF1, FF2) as defined in 
Section 3. To check for the effect of product market competition (CI) on the degree  
of labor hoarding, we include a subjective measure of competition intensity. It is 
defined as a dummy variable indicating whether or not the degree of product market 
competition is high. To check whether working time accounts have an effect on 
employment adjustment different from the effect implied by our first-stage estimates, 
we include a variable indicating the use of working time accounts for more than 50%  
of the employees.  Additional control variables are included in other (unreported) 
                                                 
13    The field work us done during the summer. Hence, variables from the 2008 panel wave do not 
reflect the impact of the crisis. 
14   The critical assumption here, which we take as given by using our first-stage estimates, is that the 
speed of adjustment is unaffected by the crisis. 17 
 
specifications but are not found to be significant. These include the export share and the 
shares of workers with particular qualifications. A set of industry dummies and firm size 
dummies (in case of short-time work and working time accounts) is also included. Since 
the shares of employees in short-time work and with working time accounts are limited 
between 0 and 100, we use a fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996) to 
estimate the parameters.  
Table 3 here 
5.2  Estimation Results  
The first four columns of Table 3 contain the second-stage results from four different 
specifications: with and without working time accounts as well as including and 
excluding firm size dummies. The fifth sixth and seventh column display marginal 
effects on the share of short-time workers (measured from 0 to 100) from fractional 
logit estimation. Three specifications are included. One includes only institutional 
variables and industry dummies. The second includes, in addition, firm size dummies, 
and the third includes also the changes in sales and wages between 2008 and 2009. The 
last specification is closest to the second-stage estimates based on the dynamic labor 
demand model, since sales and wages are accounted for in both cases.  
The first row shows that a works council has a positive impact on residual employment 
changes and on short-time work, but only if the firm size dummies are excluded. Given 
the high correlation of works councils and short-time work with firm size, the exclusion 
of firm size clearly leads to an omitted variable bias. The issue is less clear for total 
labor hoarding, where the firm size dummies are also insignificant.  A positive impact 
of the works council on residual employment in 2009 would be consistent with the view 
that works councils protect employers against employment losses. The protective role of 
the works council against involuntary job losses is found in other studies as well (e.g. 
Boockmann and Steffes 2010).  
Collective bargaining has a negative impact on labor hoarding. This is in line with the 
hypothesis that collective agreements reduce flexibility in adjusting wages and working 
hours. Consequently, employment cuts in firms with collective agreements are higher 
than normal as a response to the crisis. Thus, establishments lacking flexibility in wages 
and working conditions are forced to cut their workforces more substantially than more 
flexible firms. The dummy for firms experiencing financial frictions is insignificant. 
Recall that the questions related to financial frictions experienced when financing R&D 
or investments whereas the constraints during the crisis most likely prevailed with 
regard to working capital. The variable indicating investing firms not experiencing 18 
 
financial frictions has a positive (but insignificant) coefficient for the employment 
residual and a negative coefficient in the short-time work equation. Due to the lack  
of financial constraints, these firms have less subsidized labor hoarding.  
Competition intensity affects labor hoarding negatively – this is in line with the hypo-
thesis that profits earned in less competitive industries facilitate labor hoarding. By 
contrast, short-time work is more prevalent in more competitive industries. The effect  
is relatively small in magnitude: the marginal effect is slightly less than one percentage 
point on the share of short-time workers. It is insignificant if sales and wages are 
included.
15 This suggests that some substitution is taking place: as competition intensity 
increases, firms cannot afford unsubsidized labor hoarding and turn to short-time work 
instead. The fact that we find a positive coefficient on the dummy for manufacturing 
firms is consistent with this. 
There is no statistically significant effect of working time accounts. Concerning the 
estimated coefficients for the industry dummies, short-time work is highly concentrated 
in manufacturing and, to come extent, in construction. The positive association between 
the use of short-time work and the firm being in the manufacturing sector is another 
indication that competition intensity matters. Arguably, manufacturing firms are more 
exposed to international competition than providers of (local) services. This makes it 
more difficult to sustain suboptimally high employment numbers over a longer time 
horizon. Consistent with this, labor hoarding occurs mostly in construction, commerce 
(the baseline category) and private services. As expected, increases in sales have a 
negative effect on short-time work. Wage increases also influence the short-time work 
ratio negatively, which could indicate that the remaining costs of short-time work for 
firms are too high to make short-time work attractive if these firms are also facing wage 
increases.  
To sum up, labor hoarding and short-time work appear to be alternative ways of coping 
with the crisis used in different parts of the economy. Short-time work occurs in large 
companies, in manufacturing, and as a response to high competition intensity. Labor 
hoarding, by contrast, is found in service sector firms, in firms operating under low 
competitive pressure, firms with less binding collective agreements, and in firms with 
works councils. 
                                                 
15   Unlike the marginal effect, the coefficient remains significant at the five percent level.  19 
 
6  Conclusions 
Although the German economy has been hit hard by the crisis that started in 2007, the 
employment response has been muted. In this paper, we use recent information from a 
firm-level panel dataset which sheds light on the determinants of labor demand of firms 
before and during the crisis. We use a two-step empirical model. First, we estimate a 
dynamic labor demand function for the period 2000-2009. Second, we use a cross-
sectional empirical model to focus specifically on the crisis period. This modeling 
strategy has the added advantage of not constraining firm-level adjustment to be the 
same for the crisis and the pre-crisis period. 
Our study has three main findings.  
First, the long-run determinants of labor demand differ for firms with and without 
working time accounts. Firms using working time accounts for the majority of their 
employees have more persistent levels of employment and react less sensitively to 
changes in output and wages.This suggests that working time accounts provide a buffer 
against fluctuations in demand and may disburden firms from adjusting their staff 
numbers, as argued by Burda and Hunt (2011). Accounting for this longer-run effect 
though, there has been no additional effect of working time accounts on the degree of 
labor hoarding during the crisis.  
Second, we find a structural break in employment in 2009, as many firms have hoarded 
labor during the crisis. Based on panel estimates of labor demand in the years 2000-
2008, we predict the residual employment changes in 2009. The model predicts a 
decline in employment for 261 out of 425 establishments. In reality, however, only 162 
establishments actually lowered their staff numbers, corresponding to 62.1% of all 
establishments predicted to reduce employment.  
Third, the residual from the dynamic labor demand equation give us a measure of (total) 
labor hoarding. The degree of subsidized labor hoarding is measured through the use of 
short-time work. While labor hoarding is prevalent in services and in firms with works 
councils, short-time work is mainly used in manufacturing. The intensity of competition 
is an important determinant of the channel through which labor hoarding occurs. In 
firms which report being exposed to intense competition, there is less overall labor 
hoarding. These firms resort more to short-time work. Firms subject to financial 
frictions have a higher fraction of their employees in short-time work.  
Our results do not indicate which institutions were causally responsible for stabilizing 
employment numbers. For such a statement, a counterfactual experiment would be 
required, which we cannot conduct with the data at hand. What the results do indicate is 20 
 
that there is not one universal explanation for the German “job miracle”. Instead, firms 
have used multiple channels of adjustment to fluctuations in demand, and the labor 
market reforms of the early 2000s have provided them with additional channels of 
adjustment. Hence, policy should aim at providing firms with a flexible tool-box that 
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Data Appendix  
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data taken from the IAB Establishment-
Level Panel (IAB Betriebspanel). (See http://betriebspanel.iab.de/infos.htm for details.) 
The following Table gives a summary of data available from the IAB Establishment-
Level Panel, which are used for this project. The IAB Establishment-Level Panel is a 
large panel dataset, which is representative for German firms. The panel is a survey of 
German firms with a special focus on employment conditions. The survey has been 
conducted annually since 1993, and panel data are available for about 16,000 plants 




2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Financial 
frictions 
Dummy variable reporting 
problems to raise external 
capital for investments 
(2004, 2007, 2009: … for 
R&D) 
x 
(2001)   x 
(2004)    x 
(2007)   
 
Difficulties with obtaining 
credit finance? 5 possible 
answers 
       x 
(2009)
  Share of cash flow in 
investments     x 
(2004)    x 
(2007)   
  Share of subsidies in 
financing investments    x 
(2003)
x 
(2004)    x 
(2007)   
Export share  Share of foreign sales in 
total sales (previous 
business year) 












Productivity  Labor productivity (value 
added / employment), 
Value added = sales less 
intermediate inputs  












 Business  conditions, 
indicator variable (1-5), (i) 
previous year, (ii) 
expectations for current 
business year 
x x x x x x x 
(2009)
 
R&D activity (0/1) 
x 
(2001) x    x  x 
 Implementation  of 
innovations (0/1) (in the 
past two years) 
x 
(2001) x    x  x  x 
(2008)
 Innovation  problems  (= 
innovations which could 
not be implemented)(0/1) 
(in the past 2 years) 
x 







2004 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Employment 
conditions 
Personnel shortage (0/1) 
(expected in the coming 2 
years),  
x 
(2000) x  x  x  
  Wage cost problems (0/1) 
(expected in the coming 
two years), 
x 
(2000) x  x  x  
 
Works council (0/1) 
X x x x x x x 
 
Collective bargaining (0/1) 
X x x x x x x 
 
Share of unskilled workers 
x x x x x x x 
  Arbeitszeitkonten (yes/no, 
share of employment) 
x 




       x    
  Employee ownership / 
profit sharing agreements 
(yes / no, share of 
employees covered) (as of 
time of survey, i.e. 
summer) 
x 
(2000)   x   x    x x 
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Figure 2: Labor Market Institutions and Financial Frictions by Firm Size (2009) 
For the year 2004, the question on financial frictions refers to financing R&D; for the remaining years, it 






















































Source: IAB Establishment Panel for Baden-Württemberg, 2009 28 
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Table 1:   Correlations Between Log Employment Changes and Institutional 
Variables (2009) 
*, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
Share of employees in short-time work  -0.096*** 
Working time accounts  -0.095*** 
Works council  0.007 
Collective agreement  -0.060* 
Financial frictions  -0.048 
No financial frictions  0.046 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel for Baden-Württemberg, 2009 
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Table 2: Labor Demand Baseline Regression Results  
This Table reports the results of the first-state regressions described in Section 4.1. The dependent variable is the log of the number of employees as of 2000 to 
2009 (mid-year). Results are robust, one-step system GMM estimates. The baseline specification is in columns headed (1). Column (2) contains results from a 
specification with industry and works council dummies.  Column (3) has results for firms having working time accounts for more than 50% of their employees, 
column (4) for firms having working time accounts for less than 50% of their employees or less (including those who do not use working time accounts at all). 
Standard errors are included in parentheses. *, **, ***: significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Baseline  Working time 
account > 50% 
Working time 
account < 50% 
   GMM OLS  Fixed  Effects  GMM  GMM  GMM 
log employmentt-1 0.81***  0.96***  0.51***  0.79***  0.87***  0.73*** 
 (0.040)  (0.006)  (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.055) 
log sales  0.16***  0.04***  0.14***  0.15***  0.08***  0.23*** 
 (0.033)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.048) 
log wages  -0.06  -0.04***  -0.08***  -0.08  -0.07  -0.13 
 (0.063)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.058)  (0.042)  (0.083) 
Works  council  (0/1)      0.04***  0.02  0.05** 
      (0.017)  (0.023)  (0.023) 
Constant -1.28***  -0.11*  0.20  -0.91**  -0.29  -1.49*** 
  (0.427) (0.058) (0.134) (0.370) (0.312)  (0.488) 
Time  dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry  dummies  no No no yes  yes  yes 
Observations  5,265 5,265 5,265 5,207 2,405 2,794 
Number of firms  1,325  1,325  1,324  582  736 
Number of instruments  141      197 197 197 
Hansen statistic  141.6      187.7 202.9 195.4 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.211      0.314 0.107 0.191 
Hansen test (degrees of freedom)  129      179 179 179 
AR test (1) (p-value)  0.000      0.000  0.000  0.001 
AR test (2) (p-value)  0.483      0.504  0.208  0.236 31 
 
Table 3:   Regression of Residual Employment Changes, Short-time Work, and Working Time Accounts 
This Table presents the results of the regressions described in Section 5. The dependent variable in the first four columns is the prediction of the change in log 
employment from 2008 to 2009, using the model estimated in equation (2). The dependent variables in the fifth, sixth and seventh column are the proportion of 
workers in short-time work. These three columns contain numerically estimated marginal effects calculated at the mean of the variables on the share of short time 
workers (in percent). Standard errors are estimated robustly and included in parentheses. The number of observations is smaller in the regressions using log 
employment change as the dependent variable because this variable is generated from a panel regression using data for firms with at least four years of data. The 
short-time work ratio is available for a larger cross-section of firms. The baseline category for the industry dummies is commerce. *, **, ***: significant at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
  Residual Log Employment Change   Short-Time Work Ratio 
  First-stage model without        
working time accounts 
First-stage model including       
working time accounts 
Works council  0.06** 0.04 0.05** 0.04  1.16***  0.14  0.74 
  (0.026) (0.036) (0.026) (0.035) (0.394) (0.342) (0.802) 
Collective agreement  -0.05* -0.06** -0.05*  -0.05*  -0.47  -0.47  -0.85 
  (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.314) (0.307) (0.616) 
Financial frictions  0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.89 1.00 0.66 
  (0.088) (0.089) (0.087) (0.087) (0.907) (1.035) (1.952) 
No financial frictions  0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04  -0.72*  -0.90**  -0.63 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.418) (0.437) (1.024) 
Competition intensity  -0.04* -0.05* -0.04* -0.04*  0.96***  0.86*** 1.10 
  (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.318) (0.292) (0.690) 
Working time accounts  -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.53  0.15  0.60 
  (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.326) (0.308) (0.670) 
Employees: 20-99   0.01  0.02   2.54***  4.86** 
   (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.829)  (2.128) 
Employees: 100+   0.04  0.03   3.34***  3.35* 
   (0.045)  (0.042)  (1.150)  (1.933) 
∆ Sales 2008-2009         - 1 . 5 5 * * *  
         ( 0 . 4 8 5 )  
∆ Wages 2008-2009         - 2 . 4 8 * * *  
         ( 0 . 7 3 0 )  32 
 
 
Table 3:   Regression of Residual Employment Changes, Short-time Work, and Working Time Accounts (continued) 
  Residual Log Employment Change   Short-Time Work Ratio 
  First-stage model without         
working time accounts 
First-stage model including        
working time accounts 
Agriculture/Forestry/Mining  -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.23***  -0.53  -0.28  3.67 
  (0.078) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077) (1.112) (1.179) (5.401) 
Manufacturing  -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.11*** 12.38***  9.84**  20.02** 
  (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (4.542) (4.064) (8.909) 
Construction  0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 7.31 7.35  14.38 
  (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (4.970) (5.073)  (11.837) 
Services (for-profit)  -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 1.12  1.06  1.96 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (1.085) (1.014) (2.562) 
Services (public sector and non-
profit organizations) 
-0.16*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -3.26*** -2.86*** -1.84*** 
(0.036) (0.040) (0.033) (0.037) (0.599) (0.546) (0.609) 
Constant  (0.046) (0.047) (0.045) (0.046)       
  0.09* 0.09* 0.08* 0.08*       
Observations  399 399 399 399  1,109  1,109  439 
R²  0.066 0.068 0.067 0.068      
 